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A New External Action Service Needs 
a New European Security Strategy 
Sven Biscop 
No  strategy  lasts  forever.  The  time  has 
come  to  review  and  to  complete  the 
European Security Strategy. The necessity 
is  evident;  so  is  the  opportunity,  with  the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A new 
External  Action  Service  needs  a  clear 
mandate: a new strategy. 
Necessity  
The  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  needs 
revising.  
 
Adopted  by  the  European  Council  back  in 
2003, it has lost its flair. That is not a criticism 
of the ESS, the contents of which remain valid, 
but  an  unavoidable  reality.  After  a  while,  any 
strategic  concept  reaches  the  “best  consumed 
before”  date  and  no  longer  serves  to  inspire 
and,  most  importantly,  to  drive  policy  and 
action. The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
ESS,  being  insufficiently  concrete  and 
prospective, did not rectify this.  
 
The ESS is incomplete though, so more than 
reviewing,  it  needs  completing.  It  operates  at 
the  grand  strategic  level,  “connecting  large 
means and large ends” (Gaddis, 2009). On the 
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ends  it  remains  vague  however.  The  ESS 
mostly gives us a method: the EU deals with 
foreign  policy  in  a  preventive,  holistic  and 
multilateral way. In other words, the ESS tells 
us how to do things, but not really what to do. 
The  choice  for  this  particular  method  is  a 
crucial strategic decision, but because the EU 
and the Member States have not translated it 
into  clear  priorities,  it  has  not  generated 
sufficient action. Nor has it had a real impact 
on the development of means and capabilities, 
on which the ESS remains vague as well.  
 
That is not to say that the EU is inactive – far 
from it. But without clear strategic objectives 
connecting  its  actions,  it  underperforms.  Its 
actions have less effect than they could have – 
strategy  functions  as  a  multiplier.  Without  a 
more complete strategy, preventive action and 
rapid reaction especially, two of the key aims 
of  the  ESS,  are  virtually  impossible,  witness 
the initial improvisation on Libya.  
 
By contrast, other global powers often have a 
much  clearer  idea  of  their  interests  and 
objectives  and  thus  act  in  a  much  more 
purposive and resolute manner. In interaction 
with these powers, the EU is bound to come 
up short if it retains it current mostly reactive 
outlook.  
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Opportunity  
Fortunately, there now is an ideal opportunity 
to revisit the ESS. The entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty has generated great expectations 
both within and outside the EU. What will the 
EU  do  with  its  enhanced  foreign  policy 
machinery? A new ESS adopted by the Heads 
of  State  and  Government  in  the  European 
Council  would  provide  the  answer.  The 
priorities it sets should then steer the next EU 
budgetary cycle. In times of financial constraint, 
prioritization is more necessary than ever.  
 
Engaging  in  a  comprehensive  and  thorough 
strategic reflection involving all components of 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
would  be  an  excellent  way  of  forging  the 
beginnings of a shared culture and outlook in 
the new service. The review process in itself is 
essential,  as  Robert  Hunter  (2009)  proves: 
“following  the  conclusion  of  the  exercise, 
everyone has a better idea of where each ally 
stands, what the agenda […] is likely to be, and, 
in general, a set of overall aspirations […]”.  
 
The current ESS was born out of the intra-EU 
divide over Iraq. Today’s frustration with the 
Union’s  divided  stance  and  lack  of  strategic 
insight  and  action  on  Libya  could  be 
transformed into positive energy by directing it 
to a revision of the ESS.  
 
Desired Outcome  
The  process  is  important,  but  what  really 
counts of course is the result: a new ESS. That 
should  definitely  confirm  the  preventive, 
holistic and multilateral outlook of the Union, 
but ought to complement it with much clearer 
objectives and thus priorities. Furthermore, it 
should  provide  more  guidance  about  the 
required  means  and  capabilities,  civilian, 
military  and  institutional.  The  European 
Council  is  the  only  body  carrying  sufficient 
weight  to  provide  a  real  impetus  for  collective 
capability development.  
 
The end result will be an ESS constituting a 
strong,  clear  and  broad  mandate  for  EU 
external action across the board, in the areas of 
competence of the Council/EEAS as well as 
the  Commission.  That  will  strengthen  the 
opportunity  and  legitimacy  for  the  key  EU-
level  actors  to  take  to  the  initiative:  the 
President  of  the  European  Council,  Herman 
Van Rompuy; the High Representative (HR), 
Catherine  Ashton;  and  the  relevant 
Commissioners. Only when they, each at their 
level, act early to initiate policy and stimulate 
the Member States is effective preventive action 
possible.  
 
The  outcome  need  not  be  limited  to  a  new 
ESS  though.  The  European  Council  can 
further give a tasking to develop specific sub-
strategies and take action in policy areas that 
are prioritized in the new ESS. One very useful 
tasking would undoubtedly concern the means 
and capabilities, notably the implementation of 
the  “Ghent  Process”  for  military  capability 
development.  
 
Drafting Method  
The  open  debate  about  the  original  ESS, 
through  seminars  involving  a  wide  array  of 
stakeholders, was an important innovation that 
should  be  preserved,  in  order  to  create  the 
widest  possible  sense  of  ownership  of  its 
successor, whilst avoiding the mistakes of the 
2008 debate. A real strategic review requires an 
incisive  debate  that  does  not  shy  away  from 
difficult questions and constructive criticism.  
 
This means:  
  Seminars involving all stakeholders in the 
implementation of the ESS (the President 
of  the  European  Council,  the  Member 
States,  the  HR,  the  EEAS,  the 
Commission, the European Parliament) as 
well as all external actors that can make a 
substantial  contribution  (academia, 
NGOs,  the  media,  the  most  significant 
partner countries and organizations).    3 
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  Setting  specific  questions  for  debate  in 
parallel working groups rather than vague 
plenary discussions.  
  Producing  incisive  discussion  notes  to 
launch the debate, by the President of the 
European  Council,  the  HR,  and  the 
Commission.  
  Inviting  external  speakers  to  offer 
constructive  criticism  and  specific 
recommendations.  
  Doing the final drafting in a small team, 
led by the HR, and integrating the advisors 
of the President of the European Council 
and the relevant Commissioners.  
  And,  most  importantly,  starting  from  a 
blank sheet of paper so as to invite creative 
thinking,  even  if  the  basic  philosophy  of 
the current ESS is to be preserved.  
 
In 2013 at the latest, ten years after the original 
one, this process should produce a new ESS.  
 
Substance of the Review:  
Values and Interests  
The  ESS  starts  from  the  philosophy  that 
durable stability can only be guaranteed where 
security, prosperity, democracy and equality are 
guaranteed to all citizens. Promoting those four 
core values in the rest of the world is the best 
way therefore to safeguard them for ourselves. 
To  that  end,  the  Union  pursues  a  holistic, 
preventive  and  multilateral  foreign  policy: 
putting  to  use  in  an  integrated  way  the  full 
range  of  instruments  of  external  action,  to 
address  the  root  causes  of  instability  and 
conflict, in partnership with others. That method 
is still valid and should be preserved.  
 
To translate this method into clearer objectives 
and  priorities,  the  review  process  should  start 
from  the  EU’s  vital  interests:  defence  against 
any military threat to the territory of the Union; 
open  lines  of  communication  and  trade;  a 
secure supply of energy and other vital natural 
resources;  a  sustainable  environment; 
manageable  migration  flows;  the  maintenance 
of  international  law  and  universally  agreed 
rights;  preserving  the  autonomy  of  the 
decision-making  of  the  EU  and  its  Member 
States.  
 
Taking into account values and interests, and 
preserving the method, priorities can then be 
outlined in key areas, notably: 
  Revitalizing the European Neighbourhood 
Policy,  fostering  democratization,  and 
rendering  conditionality  more  consistent, 
effective and credible.  
  Developing  a  horizontal  view  on  the 
strategic  partnerships,  instrumentalizing 
them  in  function  of  horizontal  foreign 
policy priorities, and developing a view on 
the reform of the multilateral architecture 
(see Renard 2011).  
  Defining priority regions and issues for the 
Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy 
(CSDP), as a tool to guide decision-making 
on operations and capability development 
(see Biscop and Coelmont 2011b).  
 
Indeed,  more  specific  implications  for  the 
necessary  means  and  capabilities  can  be 
defined,  notably  in  the  area  of  intelligence 
gathering,  and  the  planning  and  conduct  of 
preventive action and rapid reaction.  
 
Although not everybody recognizes it, already 
the  current  ESS  and  the  Report  on  its 
implementation  have  a  much  broader  scope 
than  CSDP  and  even  CFSP  –  they  really 
concern the whole of EU external action. The 
scope of the new ESS should be unambiguous: 
it  is  the  guiding  framework  for  all  areas  of 
external  competence  of  the  EEAS  and  the 
Commission, with the HR at the head, who will 
coordinate  with  the  relevant  Commission 
competences, under the overall guidance of the 
European Council and its President. This broad 
scope can be reflected in a change of title: from 
ESS to European Global Strategy.  
   4 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
Follow-Up of the Review  
One  reason  why  the  current  ESS  has  lost  its 
inspirational  function  is  the  lack  of  follow-up: 
no reporting or review mechanism was created, 
hence  there  was  no  bureaucratic  necessity  to 
continue  to  refer  to  it  in  the  decision-making 
process, in spite of its continued presence in the 
discourse  of  the  EU.  And  as  the  specific 
objectives and means were left undefined and no 
action plan to generate them was adopted, no 
benchmarks to assess implementation existed. It 
was  also  forgotten  that  once  adopted  and 
disseminated, the ESS acquires a life of its own: 
whether  the  EU  likes  it  or  not,  others  (the 
public,  but  also  third  States)  will s e e  i t  as  the 
benchmark against which to judge EU action.  
 
Therefore  clear  reporting  and  reviewing 
mechanisms are required so as not to lose the 
link between the grand strategic framework and 
day-to-day decision-making.  
 
Annual  reporting  and  debate  on  the 
effectiveness  of  EU  external  action,  i.e.  policy 
evaluation, should take place through the lens of 
the ESS that guides it, in the European Council 
as  well  as  in  the  European  Parliament.  Policy 
evaluation  at  this  strategic  level  will  inter  alia 
allow to identify in which areas there is a lack of 
translation  into  sub-strategies  and 
implementation, and in which areas EU policies 
are  overlapping  or  contradicting  each  other. 
Identifying  the  de  facto  sub-strategies  is  an 
important part of the reporting mechanism.  
 
Such  annual  policy  evaluation  could  be 
combined  with  a  forward-looking  “European 
Security  Estimate”,  assessing  the  international 
environment.  Together,  they  can  inform  an 
annual “State of the Union’s Global Strategy” in 
which the HR outlines priorities for the coming 
year.  
 
Finally, reviewing the ESS itself should not be 
accidental  but  systematic,  e.g.  at  least  every  5 
years  or  at  least  with  every  start  of  a  new  or 
renewed mandate of the HR.  
 
Conclusion  
The  EU  has  at  its  disposal  many  of  the 
instruments,  tools,  means  that  it  needs.  But 
means  only  acquire  meaning  if  they  serve  an 
end. That, unfortunately, is less clear today. As 
Joseph Nye (2011: 10) emphasizes:  
 
“Power-conversion  strategies  turn  out  to  be  a 
critical  variable  that  does  not  receive  enough 
attention.  Strategies  relate  means  to  ends,  and 
those that combine hard and soft power resources 
successfully  in  different  contexts  are  the  key  to 
smart power”.  
 
If asked what EU foreign policy is about these 
days, no answer readily comes to mind. The 
EU lacks clear foreign policy priorities. Europe 
does  invest  a  huge  diplomatic,  economic, 
military and civilian effort in many important 
issues. But in spite of that, few see the EU as 
the game-changer on the key issues of the day. 
Its efforts are not focussed enough and it lacks 
a clear strategic narrative.  
 
The EU and the Member States need to decide 
therefore where collectively they want to make 
their  mark.  Only  that  can  generate  the 
necessary drive and sense of purpose that will 
give meaning to the External Action Service.  
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